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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

NO. 47578-2019
JEROME COUNTY NO. CR27-18-4507

)

NICKOLAS ZACHORIAH FAIRCHILD,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Nickolas Zachoriah Fairchild pied guilty to one count of possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine. He was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with three years
fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. After jurisdiction was relinquished in an unrelated case,
the court here also relinquished jurisdiction. Mr. Fairchild appeals, asserting the district court
abused its discretion both by imposing an excessive sentence and by denying his Rule 35 motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In August 2018, Sgt. Gratzer of the Jerome Police Department was dispatched to a report
of an individual who had been parked in front of a gas station pump for over an hour. (R., p.10.)
When Sgt. Gratzer arrived, he found Mr. Fairchild "sleeping in the driver's seat of the vehicle
with his head laying down to his chest and the vehicle turned off with the keys in the ignition."
(R., p.11.) While talking with Mr. Fairchild, Sgt. Gratzer observed suspected drug paraphernalia
and other contraband in plain view. (R., pp.11-12.) After running Mr. Fairchild's name and date
of birth through dispatch, Sgt. Gratzer learned that a warrant for Mr. Fairchild's arrest had been
issued in Ada County. (R., p.12.) Sgt. Gratzer arrested Mr. Fairchild on that warrant. (R., p.12.)
During an inventory search of Mr. Fairchild's vehicle in preparation for it being towed, another
officer "located several syringes in the vehicle including some that contained liquid" and other
paraphernalia. (R., p.13.) Sgt. Gratzer later NIK-tested the substances, which tested presumptive
positive for amphetamines. (R., p.15.)
A Complaint was filed charging Mr. Fairchild with one count of possession of
methamphetamine. (R., pp.8-9.) After waiving a preliminary hearing, Mr. Fairchild was bound
over to the district court. (R., pp.28-31.) An Information was filed which charge Mr. Fairchild
with one count of possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.36-37.) Mr. Fairchild then agreed to
plead guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine; in exchange, the State agreed to
recommend drug court, with an underlying sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and the
State dismissing a separate case. (R., pp.56-58.) The district court accepted Mr. Fairchild's plea.
(R., pp.54-55.)
Mr. Fairchild applied for drug court in Jerome County, but was denied due to pending
charges in a separate case in Ada County. (R., p. 72.) At a pre-sentencing hearing, the State
agreed that the recommendation would be for probation, as drug court was no longer an option.
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(R., p.82.) Sentencing was continued to see if Mr. Fairchild would be eligible for drug court in
Ada County. (R., p.82.) After also being denied drug court in Ada County, Mr. Fairchild was
sentenced. (R., pp.96-97.) Both the State and Mr. Fairchild's counsel recommended the court
retain jurisdiction, as he had been "sentenced to a rider in Ada County." (Tr. Vol. 2, p.4, L.24 p.5, L.15.) The court agreed and sentenced Mr. Fairchild to a unified term of five years, with
three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.92-94.)
After Mr. Fairchild completed the retained jurisdiction program, the State recommended
the court relinquish jurisdiction, as that is what had happened with the concurrent case in Ada
County. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.9, Ls.1-8.) Mr. Fairchild's attorney recommended probation; and if the
court wasn't willing to do that, to reduce the fixed time in this case. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.9, L.10- p.11,
L.23.) The court relinquished jurisdiction and executed Mr. Fairchild's underlying sentence.
(R., pp.114-15.) The court also denied the "oral motion for a Rule 35 reduction of
[Mr. Fairchild's] sentence." (Tr. Vol. 2, p.14, Ls.1-4.)
Mr. Fairchild timely appealed from the relinquishment of the court's jurisdiction.
(R., pp.118-20.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction following Mr. Fairchild's plea of
guilty to possession of a controlled substance?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Fairchild's Rule 35 motion
to reduce the fixed portion of his sentence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years,
With Three Years Fixed, And Retained Jurisdiction Following Mr. Fairchild's Plea Of Guilty To
Possession Of A Controlled Substance

A.

Introduction
Mr. Fairchild asserts the district court abused its discretion when it retained jurisdiction

and imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed. Specifically, he asserts the
district court did not give proper weight to mitigating evidence; had the court given that
mitigating evidence proper weight, it should have led the court to a lesser sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
There are "four objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society, (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)
(citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). Even so, "the primary consideration is the good
order and protection of society, [and a]ll other factors must be subservient to that end." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations removed).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573 (1979)).
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When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original).
In this case, Mr. Fairchild contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to
exercise reason in its ultimate sentencing decision. "[R]easonableness is a fundamental
requirement." State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). "'[R]easonableness' implies that a term of
confinement should be tailored to the purposes for which the sentence is imposed." Toohill, 103
Idaho at 568.

C.

The District Court Did Not Give Sufficient Weight To Mitigating Factors That Should
Have Led It To Impose A Lesser Sentence
Mr. Fairchild asserts that, given any view of the facts, his concurrent unified sentence of

seven years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Jackson, 130 Idaho at 294. The record reflects a
wealth of mitigating evidence which, had the court given it proper weight, should have led to a
lesser sentence.
Courts are required to consider mitigating evidence in favor of the defendant. See State v.

Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002) (noting that when reviewing a sentence, Idaho's appellate
courts will "review the record on appeal, having due regard for the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest"); State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726 (2007) (same). The impact of substance abuse on the defendant's criminal conduct is "a
proper consideration in mitigation of punishment." State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5
(1981); see, e.g., Nice, 103 Idaho at 91 (reducing defendant's sentence, in part, because "the trial
court did not give proper consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in
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causing defendant to commit the crime, and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem").
In addition, if a defendant "was introduced to drugs and alcohol at a very young age," that should
also be considered as a mitigating factor. State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993);
see also State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001) (mitigating factors included the

defendant being "introduced to drug use at an early age," and that, "[ c]onsistent with his
upbringing," daily use of controlled substances as an adult). Courts should also look at "a
willingness to seek treatment," as a mitigating factor. State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing indeterminate portion of
sentence for robbery based on defendant's character, voluntary drug addiction rehabilitation,
acceptance ofresponsibility for actions, and familial support).
Mr. Fairchild is only 29, but already has a history replete with evidence that he has
suffered from a long history of drug abuse problems. (PSI, p.2.) He started smoking marijuana
when he was just
began drinking alcohol at

, and was using it daily by the time he was
(PSI, p.14.) By the time he was

(PSI, p.14.) He

he had moved

on to methamphetamine, including intravenous use, and had experimented with cocaine and
"hayze" before he was 23. (PSI, p.14.) Despite his youthful age, Mr. Fairchild already has almost
twenty years of drug use history, evidence he asserts the district court did not properly weigh as
mitigating.
When a defendant has suffered through an abusive childhood, courts should consider that
as a mitigating factor. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 690-91 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Smith
asserts that she was physically and sexually abused as a child, has a family history of mental
health issues, expressed remorse for her actions, is a first-time offender, and has employment
available to her in Alaska. Smith argues the district court imposed ... excessive sentences in
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light of these mitigating factors."); State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001)
(detailing how the defendant "endured a dreadful childhood" and his "extremely troubled
childhood [was] a factor that bears consideration at sentencing"); State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho
92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993) (highlighting the facts that the defendant, who was eighteen at the
time of the offense, had dropped out of high school, had been "subjected to an abusive
childhood, living in numerous broken homes," and "was introduced to drugs and alcohol at a
very young age and admit[ted] to being chemically dependent," but finding no abuse of
discretion in sentencing).
Mr. Fairchild's childhood history was filled with broken homes and abuse. His parents
divorced when he was

. (PSI, p.9.) After their divorce, his mother married an

individual who verbally and physically abused Mr. Fairchild. (PSI, pp.9, 20.) During that time,
Mr. Fairchild reported that both his mother and stepfather emotionally abused him. (PSI, p.20.)
After his stepfather "cheated on [his] mother," Mr. Fairchild said his mother was "messed ... up
pretty bad [and] hasn't really been right since." (PSI, p.9.) His mother later met and married
another man; but when he passed away, Mr. Fairchild said, "my mother lost it completely."
(PSI, p.9.) Mr. Fairchild "left to live with friends the second [he] was old enough to get a job"
and would only "stop in and out [until he] was 17." (PSI, p.9.)
Mr. Fairchild asserts that had these mitigating factors been given their proper weight, the
court should have imposed a lesser sentence. Accordingly, Mr. Fairchild asserts that his sentence
is excessive considering any view of the facts. Jackson, 130 Idaho at 294.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Fairchild's Rule 35 Motion

A.

Introduction
During Mr. Fairchild's rider review hearing, his counsel made an oral motion, pursuant to

Idaho Criminal Rule 35, seeking a reduction of his sentence. The district court denied that
motion. On appeal, Mr. Fairchild asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his Rule 35 motion to reduce to the fixed portion of his sentence. Specifically, he asserts the
district court did not give adequate weight to mitigating evidence that should have led it to
reduce his sentence as requested.

B.

Standard Of Review
"If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule

35 is a plea for leniency, and we review the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion."

State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (citing State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 318
(2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846 (Ct. App. 1989)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original).
"The defendant bears the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonably harsh in
light of the primary objective of protecting society and the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation and retribution." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672 (Ct. App. 1998). "Where an
appeal is taken from denial of a Rule 35 motion, our scope of review includes all information
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presented at the original sentencing hearing and at a subsequent hearing on the motion." State v.

Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 450 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing State v. Sutton, 106 Idaho 403, 404 (Ct. App.
1984)).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Fairchild's Rule 35 Motion
Mr. Fairchild asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35

Motion to reduce his sentence. Specifically, he asserts that the district court failed to exercise
reason in denying that motion, given mitigating evidence supporting that motion and his relative
success on his rider.
The support a defendant has from his family is a mitigating factor. See Shideler, l 03
Idaho at 595 (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, had the support of his family and
his employer). Mr. Fairchild's mother supported her son, not only by writing a letter detailing his
childhood mental health struggles, she attended the review hearing. (See Tr. Vol. 1., p.8, Ls.219.)
A defendant's progress towards rehabilitation during any period of incarceration is a
factor that may be mitigating. State v. Barreto, 122 Idaho 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[I]n a Rule
35 hearing, the district court may consider facts presented at the original sentencing as well as
any other information concerning the defendant's rehabilitative progress while in confinement.").
Courts should also weigh the recommendations and evaluations from correctional officials. See

State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding error in the district court's refusal to
consider "an evaluation made of him by a

worker for the Board of Correction," offered in

support of the defendant's Rule 35 motion).
Mr. Fairchild does not dispute that he had some minor issues during the rider program.
(PSI, p.55.) But even with those concerns, Mr. Fairchild did so well on his rider his case manager
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recommended that "the court consider placing this offender on probation." (PSI, p.58.)
Facilitators of each program he participated in all remarked that he made "significant" or
"observable" progress. (PSI, p.56.) The facilitator from his substance abuse program, m
particular, highlighted how Mr. Fairchild "formulated a thorough success plan, which was also
honest and clear in identifying all steps as well as strategies he will follow to maintain sobriety
and increase his chances for success." (PSI, p.56.) That facilitator also remarked that "[if
Mr. Fairchild] uses in real life what he learned from his programming, he will have a good
chance of being successful on Probation and in the community." (PSI, p.56.) Mr. Fairchild was
also approved for his plans with both housing and employment after he finished the rider.
(PSI, p.57.) However, the court stated that the "content of the APSI doesn't quite square with the
recommendations of the Department of Corrections for probation," and relinquished jurisdiction.
(Tr. Vol.I, p.13, Ls.12-14.)
Mr. Fairchild asserts the district court did not give adequate weight to any of this
mitigating evidence-evidence that should have led the district court to reduce his sentence.
Accordingly, Mr. Fairchild asserts the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fairchild respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 11 th day of June, 2020.

Isl R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of June, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

RJS/eas
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